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Abstract 
In recent years there has been an increasing use of members’ schemes of arrangement to 
bring about a change in corporate control. This increasing use of schemes has been criticised 
in public quarters on the basis that unlike takeovers, schemes are not subject to the Eggleston 
principles and have arguably led to target shareholders receiving lower offer prices. This 
study provides the first large sample empirical evidence on differences between schemes and 
takeovers. We find that the likelihood of the use of schemes significantly increases when 
target firm ownership concentration is higher and when the bidder has a lower toehold. 
Scheme usage is also more likely for larger targets and bidders with higher leverage. 
Consistent with public criticisms of schemes, we find that after controlling for self-selection 









Changes in corporate control in Australia are regulated by the Corporations Act 2001. The 
main takeover provisions in the Act are contained in Chapter 6 and include safeguards for 
target shareholders which are known collectively as the Eggleston principles (section 602). 
These safeguards are intended to ensure that takeovers take place in an “efficient, competitive 
and informed market.” In more recent years however, there has been an escalating use of the 
schemes of arrangement (SOA) provisions in Part 5.1 of the Corporations Act to effect a 
change in corporate control.1 As such, SOA are increasingly being viewed as an alternative to 
takeover bids (“takeovers”) prompting concerns about regulatory arbitrage.2 One of the key 
differences between SOA and takeovers is that to achieve compulsory acquisition, acquirers 
have to win over a lower proportion (75%) of target shareholders than in a takeover (90%).3 
Additionally, unlike takeovers, SOA are not subject to the Eggleston principles. 
The inequality in shareholder approval thresholds between the two acquisition methods and 
the non-application of the Eggleston principles to SOA has led to public criticism that target 
shareholders in schemes are not adequately protected. For example, the Sydney Morning 
Herald published an article in August 2003 headed “What’s a scheme? It is a takeover bid 
done dirt cheap” (Askew, 2003). A similar criticism was made in a July 2003 Sydney 
Morning Herald article titled “Takeover schemes backlash grows” (Hughes, 2003). Both 
articles claim that target shareholders receive a lower offer price in schemes than in 
takeovers. More recent criticisms of schemes appeared in November 2008 with the Australian 
Financial Review publishing an article “Reining in schemes of arrangement” (Ali, 2008). 
That article argues that Australia currently lacks a level playing field in regards to takeover 
regulation and that the Eggleston principles should be applied to all corporate control 
contests. Similar criticisms were also made in a discussion paper published by the Financial 
Services Institute of Australia in 2006 (FINSIA, 2006).4 The repeated concerns from the 
growing use of schemes to obtain control, led the Australian Government’s Corporations and 
Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) to issue a discussion paper on schemes in June 
                                                          
1 The increasing use of schemes of arrangement is evidenced in the statistics presented in Table 1 of this paper. 
Shikha (2013) discusses a similar trend of the increasing use of SOA to effect a change in control in the UK. 
2 Regulatory arbitrage is “capitalising on loopholes in regulatory systems in order to circumvent unfavourable 
regulation.” (Investopedia: available at: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/regulatory-arbitrage.asp). In 
relation to corporate control, FINSIA (2006, p.18) defines it as “[choosing] between legislative approaches to 
the advantage of the bidder without regard to the rights and entitlements of shareholders.” 
3  There are other differences between schemes and takeovers. These are outlined in Section 2 of the paper. 
4 “Takeovers package – Finsia’s proposal to reform Australia’s takeovers regime to improve the market for 
corporate control, removing existing anomalies and protect the rights of minority shareholders.” 
3 
 
2008. The purpose of the CAMAC review was to consider whether schemes of arrangement 
“operate in an effective and appropriate manner, and with appropriate safeguards, to facilitate 
corporate restructuring” (CAMAC, 2008).5 The final report was published in December 2009 
and concludes that schemes should continue to be an alternative mechanism to allow a 
control change (CAMAC, 2009). This conclusion was based on legal argument however as 
opposed to rigorous empirical analysis. 
Accordingly the purpose of this study is to empirically investigate: i) the characteristics of 
target and bidder firms that are associated with the choice of a scheme or takeover and ii) 
whether premiums offered in schemes and takeover bids differ after controlling for other 
factors known to affect premiums. 
There are two motivations for this study. First, a number of explanations have been advanced 
for the increase in the popularity of SOA.6 One explanation is that schemes provide certainty 
of outcome within a known period as target shareholders must either accept or reject the 
scheme at the requisite shareholder meeting. This “all or nothing” approach assists the bidder 
to obtain financing for the proposed acquisition. A second explanation is that it is easier to 
obtain full ownership of the target using a SOA because of the lower shareholder approval 
threshold. Another advantage of a SOA is that complex transactions can be more easily 
accommodated than through the use of a takeover. Although these are all plausible 
explanations, it is noteworthy that these perceived benefits have been present since the 
addition of scheme provisions into relevant Australian company legislation.7 This suggests 
that the trend towards schemes is driven more by the intrinsic characteristics of the firms 
participating in the deals than by the general benefits of SOA. As such, this study provides 
empirical evidence on the characteristics of target and bidder firms which influence the 
choice between a SOA and a takeover. 
Secondly, as described above, SOA have been publically criticised on the basis that they are 
disadvantageous to target firm shareholders. As prior research documents that target 
shareholders receive substantial premiums in acquisitions (Bates and Lemmon, 2003, Henry, 
2005, Humphrey-Jenner and Powell, 2011, Bugeja, 2013, Aspris et al., 2014), one obvious 
                                                          
5 CAMAC, (2008) ‘Members’ schemes of arrangement: Discussion paper,’ p 1. 
6 See for example paragraph 2.3.2 of the CAMAC (2008) Discussion Paper on Members’ Schemes of 
Arrangement. 
7 The CAMAC Discussion Paper on Members’ Schemes of Arrangement (2008) (paragraph 1.3.1) indicates that 




method by which target shareholders can be harmed is if SOA result in the payment of a 
lower premium. At present however, there is no rigorous empirical examination of whether 
there is any difference in premiums between SOA and takeovers. This study addresses this 
gap in the literature. 
Our empirical examination is based on a sample of 276 SOA and 555 takeovers announced 
for Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed firms over the period 2000 to 2011. We 
confirm that the choice of acquisition vehicle is consequential and not inadvertent by 
documenting systematic differences in deal and target and bidder characteristics between 
SOA and takeovers. We find that there are significant differences in the target firm ownership 
structure between SOA and takeovers. More specifically, in SOA the acquiring firm’s toehold 
is smaller; target firm ownership concentration is higher and the number of target firm 
substantial shareholders is lower. Furthermore, target firms in schemes are significantly 
larger than their counterparts in takeovers. We also find that bidding firms using SOA have 
significantly higher leverage than those using the takeover provisions. Our results also 
suggest that SOA are less likely to attract multiple bidders than takeovers. 
To test whether target shareholders are disadvantaged in a SOA, we analyse premiums paid 
in SOA and takeovers to see whether they differ, after controlling for other factors which 
prior research has shown are associated with acquisition premiums. Additionally, to control 
for self-selection bias, our analysis of premiums employs a Heckman (1979) two-step 
approach. Our results are largely consistent with premiums paid in SOA being significantly 
lower than those offered in takeovers. The size of the reduction in premium in SOA ranges 
between 16% and 40% depending on the sample restriction we employ for our investigation. 
We also use a propensity score matched sample as an alternative technique to control for the 
self-selection of acquisition form.8 The results of this analysis also indicate that shareholders 
in SOA are offered significantly lower premiums when compared with friendly takeovers. 
This study makes a number of contributions. First, we believe we are the first study which 
provides large sample empirical evidence on the differences between SOA and takeovers in 
Australia. Our results show that SOA and takeovers differ across a number of dimensions 
including target and bidder firm financial and ownership characteristics and deal 
characteristics including takeover premiums. These findings are likely to be of interest to 
                                                          
8 A discussion of the relative merits of controlling for self-selection using the Heckman (1979) two-step 
approach or propensity score matching is provided in Section 6.1. 
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regulators in any future review of the mechanisms which can be used to undertake the 
acquisition of a controlling interest in another firm. Even though our results suggest that 
shareholders receiver lower premiums in SOA, we caution against interpreting our findings 
as being indicative of undue regulatory arbitrage. Although schemes and takeovers entail 
different procedures the Corporations Act incorporate safeguards against self-dealing and the 
abuse of minority shareholders. Furthermore, due to the different transaction costs and 
structural features, there can be no certainty that acquisitions structured as a SOA would have 
been undertaken had they been required to be made as a takeover. 
Our study also contributes to prior academic literature on the market for corporate control in 
Australia. Our results suggest that studies which pool all acquisitions irrespective of 
acquisition mechanism ignore important differences across the two deal types. We 
recommend that future research in this area recognise these differences, and incorporated 
them into their research design. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the Australian 
regulatory environment governing changes in corporate control and Section 3 develops our 
hypotheses on the factors which may influence the choice between SOA and takeovers. 
Section 4 describes the sample and presents descriptive statistics, whilst Section 5 provides 
results of our analysis of the choice of deal type. In Section 6, we discuss our research design 
to test for a difference in premiums between SOA and takeovers and present the results of 
this investigation. Our conclusion and suggestions for future research are covered in the final 
section. 
2. Regulatory differences between SOA and takeovers 
Changes in corporate control in Australia are currently subject to extensive regulation. This 
has not always been the case however as takeover regulation spanned just three pages in the 
1961 Companies Act.9  A spate of unsolicited bids in the 1960s prompted a revision of the 
law. Howard (1998) reports: 
“Some bidders used aggressive tactics such as first-come, first-served offers with 
short durations and large premiums to those shareholders who were quick to respond. 
Such tactics raised concerns that some classes of shareholders were being 
disadvantaged. For example, with speedy secretive bids, control of a company could 
pass to a raider before small shareholders had an opportunity to sell their shares” (p. 
1-2). 
                                                          
9 Little (1997) includes a short history of takeover law in Australia.  
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Howard’s reference to the disadvantage suffered by small shareholders in the acquired firm 
when control passes to a “raider” reveals the implicit premise of Australian takeover 
regulation: target firm shareholders need protection against depredation by acquiring firms. 
The above premise is reflected in the four principles articulated in 1969 by the Company Law 
Advisory Committee chaired by Sir Richard Eggleston and that have since shaped Australian 
takeover legislation. The first three (Eggleston) principles are that directors and shareholders 
in the target:  
(a) know the identity of the person who proposes to acquire a substantial interest,  
(b) have reasonable time to consider the offer, and  
(c) are given enough information to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the offer. 
The fourth principle is that shareholders of the relevant class of voting shares all have a 
reasonable and equal opportunity to participate in any benefits accruing through the proposal 
(sometimes referred as the “collateral benefits” rule). 
A large set of legal provisions and substantial enforcement infrastructure give effect to the 
Eggleston Principles. The legal provisions contained mostly in Chapter 6 of the Corporations 
Act are intended to ensure that acquisition of control over a public company takes place in an 
“efficient, competitive & informed market.”10 The principal enforcement mechanism is the 
Takeovers Panel, a peer review body with members drawn from Australia’s takeovers and 
business communities which settles disputes by focusing primarily on commercial and policy 
issues.  
Notwithstanding the extensive set of provisions in Chapter 6, a large proportion of changes of 
control in public companies fall outside its sway and into the domain of “members’ schemes 
of arrangement.” Schemes are a mechanism for a binding arrangement to be drawn between a 
company and its shareholders, including arrangements to change the corporate structure or 
shareholdings. They are: 
“intended to provide machinery (i) for overcoming the impossibility or 
impracticability of obtaining the individual consent of every member of the class 
                                                          
10 The descriptive terms “efficient”, “competitive” and “informed” are not defined. Given the influence of the 
Eggleston Principles it seems reasonable to infer that adherence to them is, in effect, deemed the minimum 
requirement to ensure an efficient, competitive and informed market. 
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intended to be bound thereby, and (ii) for preventing, in appropriate circumstances, a 
minority of class members frustrating a beneficial scheme.”11 
Chapter 6 protects minority shareholders from unfair treatment by an acquirer. Schemes have 
the complementary objective: they prevent a minority of shareholders frustrating a beneficial 
binding agreement, including those that may entail a change in control. The difference in 
orientation is reflected, in part, in the thresholds for compulsory acquisition: acquirers may 
compulsorily acquire target shareholders’ shares once they purchase 90% of their target’s 
voting power but a scheme allows compulsory acquisition with the approval of a 75% 
majority of shares voted.12 Although the Eggleston principles do not apply to SOA, the 
fairness of a SOA transaction to shareholders is arguably protected through the role of the 
court and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). The court is 
involved at two stages of a SOA, first to call a meeting of shareholders to consider the 
scheme and second to implement the scheme after approval by shareholders. The role of 
ASIC in a SOA is to review disclosures and other information provided in scheme 
documentation and where necessary to appear before the court to make submissions on 
relevant issues in scheme documentation or to object to the approval of the scheme. 
The flexibility of schemes to implement various kinds of organisational restructuring means 
they provide fewer explicit safeguards against practices that violate “fair conduct” under the 
takeover code. For instance, in 2010, investment group CP2 asked the Takeover Panel to 
prevent its target, Transurban Group, from proceeding with a A$543 million equity issue on 
the basis that the equity issue was an unreasonable “frustrating action” against CP2’s attempt 
to acquire control. Tellingly, CP2 invoked the Eggleston Principles in its approach to the 
Takeovers Panel by submitting that the effect of Transurban’s equity issue was to  
“(a) interfere with the reasonable and equal opportunity of security holders to 
participate in, and benefit from, the change of control transaction proposed by the 
consortium, (b) inhibit the efficient, competitive and informed market for control of 
Transurban securities and (c) deny security holders a reasonable time to consider the 
proposed change of control transaction and prevented them from having enough 
information to enable them to assess the merits of the proposal.”13 
The Takeovers Panel rebuffed CP2 on the grounds that  
                                                          
11 CAMAC Discussion Paper (2008) paragraph 1.3.2. 
12 Previously a scheme required the approval of both a simple majority of shareholders present under the 
headcount test and a 75% majority under the voted shares test. The headcount test has been amended so that the 
court has discretion to approve a scheme if it has been approved by a 75% majority of shares voted despite the 
headcount test not being met. 




“the Panel's guidance on frustrating action applies to a 'potential bid', which is defined 
as "a genuine potential bid communicated to target directors publicly or privately 
which is not yet a formal bid under Chapter 6". The consortium's proposals were for 
the acquisition of Transurban by way of scheme of arrangement. … The proposals did 
not constitute potential bids because they were proposed schemes and they were 
rejected.”14  
Underscoring the difference between bids and schemes more recently, an investor’s capacity 
to block a scheme resulted in the scheme’s proponents to make an offer to buy out the 
investor’s minority stake in another company. Retail investor Mr Solomon Lew had South 
Africa’s Woolworths Holdings Limited offer him a substantial premium for his minority 
stake in Country Road Limited conditional on his support of a scheme that passes control of 
retailer David Jones Limited to Woolworths. This agreement would not be allowed if 
Woolworths had sought to acquire David Jones via a takeover bid. As noted earlier, under the 
fourth Eggleston principle, all shareholders must have reasonable and equal opportunity to 
participate in any benefits accruing through the proposal.  
In response to similar earlier cases, FINSIA’s Markets Policy Group released in 2006 a 
proposal to reform Australia’s takeover regime that included a recommendation to remove 
inconsistencies between the regulation of SOA and takeovers. FINSIA argued that the use of 
schemes to effect changes in corporate control has “resulted in shareholders being deprived 
of the protection which legislators intended they should have when takeover laws were 
formulated.”15 One plank of FINSIA’s argument was a change in the nature of how schemes 
were used. FINSIA alleged that whilst schemes previously were used mainly for complex 
transactions that could not be undertaken by way of a takeover and in “agreed mergers” 
between companies of equal size, they were now being used to launch hostile transactions by 
way of “bear hugs.”16 Section 411 (17) of the Corporations Act provides that the court cannot 
approve a scheme if it is satisfied it has been proposed to avoid a takeover. But the courts 
have taken a liberal attitude and read down this requirement to the extent that CAMAC in 
2009 recommended that this section be repealed and a SOA be recognised as a valid 
alternative to takeover bids.17 CAMAC based its recommendation on the grounds that both 
bids and schemes have their procedural protections and there is demonstrated demand in the 
                                                          
14 Australian Government Takeovers Panel, Reasons for Decision Transurban Group (2010), p.4. 
15 FINSIA “Takeovers Package” (2006, p. 18). 
16  FINSIA claimed that “in a ‘bear hug’ the bidder induces the target to agree to recommend to shareholders the 
company’s acquisition with the sanction that if the target board does not recommend the offer, the board’s 
refusal will be made public and its decision will be subject to the public scrutiny of shareholders and market 
commentators.” 
17 CAMAC (2009) Report on Members’ Schemes of Arrangement, paragraph 6.4.2. 
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market for both mechanisms to effecting changes of control. Further, CAMAC articulated a 
reason for distinguishing between bids and SOA. It declared the Eggleston Principles:   
“were developed in the context of Chapter 6 bids, to protect shareholders where a 
bidder can bypass the directors of the target company and make an offer directly to 
them. They are not necessarily appropriate in the context of schemes, even where 
control may be at stake. A scheme proposal comes from the company itself, whose 
directors have a duty to act in the best interests of the company in putting forward the 
scheme, and both the court and ASIC have a protective role. The fact that a scheme 
and a bid may have a similar ultimate outcome does not necessarily mean that the 
same form of protection is required.”18 
CAMAC’s distinction between bid and scheme contexts arguably provides a basis for 
justifying a higher compulsory acquisition threshold for takeover bids. A target’s board is 
usually better placed than its shareholders to assess the merits of a deal. The finding that the 
target firm’s board recommendation is the most important influence on the outcome of a bid 
supports this premise (Henry, 2005).  Given this, one implication is that deals initiated and 
recommended by the board should require a relatively low threshold for approval by 
shareholders to be binding on all otherwise a few shareholders may hold the others hostage. 
On the other hand, when bid offers are made directly to shareholders, it is reasonable that a 
higher shareholder approval threshold be applied before compulsory acquisition because the 
bids are not initiated by the targets’ respective boards. 
The FINSIA (2006) and CAMAC (2009) reports usefully set out two contrasting views on the 
merits of having changes in corporate control implemented through either takeovers or SOA. 
FINSIA’s (2006) recommendation to remove inconsistencies between the two sets of 
regulatory provisions reflects its concern to minimise the possibility of target firms’ being put 
under undue pressure to acquiesce to schemes, whilst CAMAC’s (2009) endorsement of both 
takeover bids and schemes is based on its view that schemes provide adequate protection 
given that they originate from the company itself. 
Strikingly, notwithstanding the two longstanding divergent views on the merits of having two 
regulatory vehicles to effect changes of corporate control, there has been little empirical 
research on the factors influencing the choice of either a takeover bid or scheme in Australia 
or the impact of the choice on premiums received by target shareholders. This means that 
policy makers and regulators have largely relied on anecdotal evidence to determine what 
drives the choice of a takeover bid or scheme and their outcomes. One consequence is that 
                                                          
18 CAMAC (2009) Report on Members’ Schemes of Arrangement, paragraph 6.4.2. 
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sensationalised reporting of particular cases drives regulatory reform, as Hutson (1998), 
among others, has noted. Accordingly, this study addresses this gap through the provision of 
large sample empirical evidence highlighting differences between SOA and takeovers. 
3. Hypothesis development on the choice of deal type 
Ownership concentration 
We first examine the factors which influence the choice between SOA and takeovers. Other 
things being equal, acquiring firms’ choice of a SOA or bid depends on which method 
provides the best chance of achieving control. Given that the threshold for compulsory 
acquisition is 75% of shares voted in schemes and 90% of all issued shares in bids, we may 
expect schemes to dominate bids if acquirers had unfettered choice. One reason schemes do 
not dominate is that target firms with concentrated owners are well placed to avoid the “hold 
up” element inherent in schemes. As a result, we posit the likelihood of a scheme being 
selected is a function of the ownership structure of the target firm; in particular, we predict 
acquirers of target firms with widely dispersed ownership are more likely to use a scheme as 
this reflects the greater bargaining power of the prospective acquirers. 
The terms of schemes of arrangement, once approved by the court to be put to the target 
firm’s shareholders, are not easily amended. This means far less opportunity for the market to 
be tested or further negotiations to take place. If the target’s shareholders are widely 
dispersed with no one having sufficient investment at stake to warrant investigating the terms 
agreed to by the board or to canvas for a competing offer they have no effective recourse 
other than to accept reasonable offers. In contrast, concentrated shareholders in target firms 
are in a better position to insist on the acquiring firm’s bid being tested under the “open 
auction” rules that characterise takeover bids. Further, terms of bids are more easily amended 
so that the best price can be extracted from acquirers. This view of the incidence of schemes 
and bids being reflective of the strategic choices made by the target firm is consistent with 
Schwert’s (2000) analysis of hostility in takeovers. Schwert’s empirical tests “show that most 
deals described as hostile in the press are not distinguishable from friendly deals in economic 
terms, except that hostile transactions involve publicity as part of the bargaining process” (p. 
2599). 
Given the above, we posit: 
H1: The likelihood of the use of a SOA decreases with target firm ownership concentration. 
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Another explanation for why the use of SOA is expected to decrease with a higher target firm 
ownership concentration is that a widely dispersed target firm ownership increases the 
number of different shareholders who must accept the offer for the bidder to acquire 100% 
ownership. The increased difficulty of convincing a greater number of shareholders to accept 
the offer leads us to predict that bidders for target firms with widely dispersed ownership will 
prefer to use a SOA to raise the probability of takeover success. 
We proxy target firm ownership dispersion (CONC) using three alternative measures: the 
percentage ownership of the Top 20 (TOP20), Top 5 (TOP5) and of the Top 1 (TOP1) 
shareholders disclosed for the financial year-end prior to the takeover announcement. We 
also consider substantial shareholdings in the target firm. As the ownership level of 
substantial shareholders increases, the greater is their ability to insist on a takeover bid rather 
than a SOA. The aggregate ownership of substantial shareholders (SUBSHPER) is measured 
at the financial year-end prior to the takeover announcement. As an alternative measure of the 
influence of substantial shareholders, we use the number of substantial shareholders 
(SUBSSHNO) disclosed at the financial year-end before the takeover. 
Bidder toehold 
The larger the prospective acquirer’s toehold in the target, the lower is the attractiveness of a 
SOA because the acquirer is not allowed to vote their shares at the meeting seeking scheme 
approval and they must still receive support from 75% of remaining shareholders to acquire 
100% ownership. In these circumstances, the acquirer with a large toehold faces the prospect 
of “hold-up” by a relatively small proportion of target firm shareholders. For instance, an 
acquirer with a 60% toehold requires 75% of the remaining 40% of shareholders to agree to 
the terms. Furthermore, presenting a credibly non-self interested recommendation to the 
target shareholders is difficult when the acquirer exerts substantial influence over the board. 
In this case, making an offer under the auspices of the takeover provisions provides the 
acquirer with the ability to test the market and give itself the option to vary the terms of the 
acquisition in case the initial offer proves unattractive. This leads to Hypothesis Two: 
H2: The likelihood of the use of a SOA decreases with the bidding firm toehold in the target 
firm. 




Target firm size 
Larger targets pose greater risks for prospective acquirers, one of the risks being the prospect 
of drawing down on financial capacity but only partially acquiring the target and not 
achieving one’s economic objectives. In terms of financing deals, SOA have the attractive 
feature of providing a specific date when the outcome of the offer is known. Furthermore, 
due to the difficulty in revising terms after approval by the court, a SOA provides greater 
certainty about the terms of the acquisition. Since the value of these features increases with 
the size of the prospective financial outlay, acquirers of larger targets are expected to find the 
all or nothing nature of scheme financing more attractive. This leads us to Hypothesis Three: 
H3: The likelihood of the use of a SOA increases with target firm size. 
Target firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of target firm market capitalisation 
(TLNMCAP) at the end of the financial year before the takeover. 
Leverage 
Consistent with the above discussion, the CAMAC (2008) report observed that bidders prefer 
schemes as the greater certainty of outcome associated with the use of schemes reduces the 
difficulty of arranging financing of the deal. The benefit of greater financing certainty is 
likely to be of more importance to bidders that would otherwise have greater difficulty 
arranging funds to make the acquisition. As such, we predict that SOA are the preferred deal 
type when the bidder has higher pre-acquisition leverage. In a similar fashion, the leverage of 
the target firm is likely to influence the choice of deal type.  If the target firm has relatively 
low leverage the bidder is able to benefit from this unused debt capacity post-acquisition and 
should have less concern with having certainty of financing. In contrast, a higher level of 
target firm leverage increases the importance of financing certainty. As a result we predict the 
use of SOA is positively associated with the leverage of the bidder and target firm.   
H4: The likelihood of the use of a SOA increases with target and bidding firm leverage. 
Control variables 
We include the aggregate ownership of the target firm board as a control in our model of the 
choice of deal type. As the SOA process is managed by the target firm, schemes are by their 
nature friendly acquisitions. Henry (2005) examines the factors which are associated with the 
attitude of the target firm board and finds that board ownership is positively related to an 
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accept recommendation (i.e., friendly deals). As such, it would be expected that in 
comparison to the entire sample of takeovers (i.e., both hostile and friendly), target board 
ownership is expected to be higher in deals structured as a SOA. In contrast, this variable is 
expected to be insignificant when we compare schemes with only friendly takeovers. The 
percentage ownership of the target firm board (TDIROWN) is measured at the date of the 
takeover announcement. 
We add to the model a number of target firm financial characteristics including: return on 
assets (TROA), market-to-book ratio (TMB) and free cash flow (TFCF). Each of these 
variables is measured at the end of the financial year immediately prior to the takeover 
announcement. Target firm free cash flow is proxied as net operating cash flows minus 
dividends scaled by total assets.  We form no a priori expectations as to how these variables 
influence the choice of deal type. 
In summary, we estimate the following probit regression model to examine the factors which 
influence the choice between schemes and takeovers.   
SOA = i + 1TOEHOLD + 2CONC + 3TDIROWN + 4TROA + 5TMB + 6TDE + 
7TFCF + 8TLNMCAP + INDUSTRY + YEAR + i          (1a) 
The dependent variable is a binary variable coded as one for deals structured as a SOA. This 
model is estimated first for our entire sample of acquisitions and then second after restricting 
our sample to only SOA and friendly takeovers.19 We undertake this secondary analysis as 
schemes are by their nature friendly acquisitions and as such friendly takeovers are likely to 
be a more appropriate comparison group. 
We also estimate an extended version of regression model (1a) which adds the following 
bidding firm financial characteristics (which we refer to as model 1(b)):  firm size 
(BLNMCAP), return on assets (BROA), free cash flow (BFCF) and the market-to-book ratio 
(BMB). These variables are defined identically to those for the target firm. These variables 
are measured at the end of the financial year immediately preceding the takeover. 
As we can only obtain financial information for bidders if the firm is listed on the ASX, the 
sample size for the estimation of model (1b) is smaller than the sample used to estimate 
                                                          
19 Friendly takeovers are defined as those in which the initial recommendation of the target firm board is to 
accept the offer. 
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model 1(a).  In a similar fashion to that described above, we estimate model (1b) firstly for all 
deals involving a listed bidder and then alternatively using only SOA and friendly takeovers. 
Both models (1a) and (1b) include indicator variables to highlight target firm industry 
(INDUSTRY) and the year (YEAR) of the announcement of the deal.20 
4. Sample  
Takeovers and SOA for ASX listed targets between 2000 and 2011 are identified using the 
Connect 4 Mergers and Acquisitions database.21 Data on takeover characteristics including  
toehold, the percentage ownership and recommendation of the target firm board are collected 
from takeover and scheme documents lodged by the bidder and target firms with the ASX. 
All necessary financial information is hand collected from the respective financial statements 
of the bidder and target firm. The financial statements of target firms are also used to collect 
ownership concentration details. Financial statements and takeover and scheme documents 
are downloaded from the DatAnalysis Premium database. Observations with insufficient data 
to estimate the regression models are excluded from the sample resulting in the exclusion of 
44 takeovers and 35 SOA. The final sample comprises 555 takeovers and 276 schemes. 
Table 1 summarises the distribution of schemes and takeovers over the sample period using 
both deal numbers and deal value. Based on deal numbers, 33% of deals over the sample 
period are structured as SOA. The highest proportion of schemes occurs in 2007 with 46% of 
deals structured as schemes. In no year over the sample period do SOA comprise the majority 
of deal numbers. Subsequent to 2006 there appears to be an increase in the frequency of 
acquisitions structured as SOA. The second set of columns in Table 1 present the size of 
deals undertaken by SOA and takeovers across each year of the sample. Deal size is 
approximated by the target firm market capitalisation at the financial year end prior to the 
deal announcement. In contrast to the raw numbers, this analysis shows that 55% of total deal 
value between 2000 and 2011 occurred through the use of SOA. For five of the twelve year 
sample period the market capitalisation of deals structured as SOA exceeds that of deals 
arranged as takeovers. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
                                                          
20 Target firm industry is defined using two digit GICS codes. 
21 To ensure we are comparing equivalent deal types, schemes are only included in the sample if they involve an 
offer solely for a change of control. For example, SOA which involve a simultaneous change of control and the 
“spin-off” of a subsidiary are excluded from the sample. This restriction results in the exclusion of 52 SOA. 
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Table 2 shows the breakdown of the sample into SOA and takeovers using the two digit 
GICS code of the target firm.  For most industry groups the percentage of deals structured as 
schemes ranges between 26 and 33%. The exceptions are the health care and financials 
industries for which just under half of deals are arranged as schemes. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the variables included in the regression model 
examining the choice of deal type.  The target board on average owns 11% of the target firm, 
whilst the average bidding firm toehold is 13%. The mean Top 20 target firm shareholding is 
68%, whilst the average substantial shareholder ownership in the target firm is 47%. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
For each variable, we also compare differences in the means between firms in the SOA and 
takeover groups. This comparison is presented for the entire sample and also using only those 
takeovers that are classified as friendly. A t-test/(chi-squared test) for continuous/(binary) 
variables is also conducted to test if these differences are significant. The target firm 
ownership variables show a number of significant differences between SOA and takeovers. In 
comparison to takeovers, SOA are characterised by a significantly lower: bidding firm 
toehold, substantial shareholder ownership and target firm board ownership (friendly group 
comparison only). The comparison with friendly deals also shows that target firms involved 
in schemes have significantly lower ownership concentration (i.e., Top 20, Top 5 and Top 1) 
than target firms in takeovers. In contrast, the opposite conclusion holds, for Top 20 and Top 
5 ownership when comparing all deals. Overall, the univariate results suggest that consistent 
with Hypothesis One, schemes are used more frequently when the ownership of the target 
firm is widely dispersed. 
Some other notable differences in target and bidding firm financial characteristics between 
schemes and takeovers are evident from Table 3. As predicted, in SOA target and bidding 
firms have significantly higher leverage. Also, consistent with expectations, target firms in 
schemes are significantly larger than their counterparts in takeovers. The results also indicate 
that target firms in takeovers have significantly lower performance as measured by ROA. 
Apart from leverage, there is no statistical difference in the other bidding firm characteristics 
between schemes and takeovers. 
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A correlation matrix between the independent variables included in regression model (1) is 
provided in Table 4.  Panel A presents correlations for the full sample of deals, whilst Panel 
B show correlations for only those deals with an ASX listed bidder. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
In both Panels the highest correlations are between: target and bidder firm leverage; target 
and bidder firm size, and free cash flow and ROA for both the bidder and target firms. There 
is also a high positive correlation between the bidding firm toehold and the ownership stake 
of the Top 20/5/1 shareholders in the target firm. Despite these high correlation results, an 
examination of VIF factors for our regression analysis indicates that multicollinearity is not a 
problem with our analysis. 
5. Results for choice of deal type 
Table 5 provides the results of the probit regression estimates on the choice between SOA 
and takeovers. In Panel A the results are presented for the entire sample of deals (Model 
1(a)), whilst in Panel B the findings are given for only deals in which the bidder is listed 
(Model 1(b). As discussed in Section 3, model 1(b) includes a number of bidder 
characteristics as additional controls. For both panels the results are provided separately for 
all deals and then for SOA and friendly takeovers. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
A number of findings are consistent across both panels and are significant irrespective of 
whether we focus on all deals or just friendly deals.  For example, consistent with Hypothesis 
Two the toehold stake of the bidder is significantly lower in SOA indicating that the lower 
compulsory acquisition threshold leads bidders to be less concerned at acquiring a pre-bid 
interest in the target firm. Furthermore, as predicted the likelihood that a deal uses a SOA 
significantly increases with the size of the target firm. 
Beyond the toehold stake of the bidder in the target firm, the results on the other target firm 
ownership variables provide mixed findings. Inconsistent with Hypothesis One, in Panel A 
the ownership of the Top 1 shareholder increases the likelihood of the use of a SOA, whilst 
the ownership of substantial shareholders is insignificant. In contrast, when we control for 
bidding firm characteristics in Panel B the results support Hypothesis One with the number of 
substantial shareholders decreasing the frequency of use of SOA. However, the ownership of 
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the Top 20/5/1 shareholder(s) remains insignificant. In both panels, ownership of the target 
firm directors is unrelated to the choice between SOA and takeovers. 
Hypothesis Four predicts higher target and bidder firm leverage increases the likelihood of 
the use of schemes. Consistent with this expectation the findings in Panel A show target firm 
leverage significantly raises the likelihood that the deal is structured as a scheme. This 
significant result however, is not robust to the inclusion of bidding firm financial 
characteristics in the regression as shown in Panel B. The results in Panel B however 
highlight that higher bidding firm leverage is associated with a greater use of schemes as 
expected. 
Beyond target firm size and leverage, the other financial characteristics of the target firm do 
not appear to influence the decision as to whether to structure the deal as a scheme or 
takeover. Panel A shows that a higher market-to-book ratio lowers the use of SOA when 
considering the results for the entire sample. The findings in Panel B indicate however, that 
this variable become insignificant when bidding firm characteristics are added as additional 
control variables. 
The findings in Panel B show that a number of other bidding firm financial variables are 
associated with the choice of deal structure but only when we use the entire sample of 
acquisitions without regard to the attitude of the target firm board. Bidding firm ROA and 
market-to-book ratio are associated with a reduced likelihood of the use of SOA, whilst 
bidder free cash raises the probability of the use of schemes. It is notable however, that these 
variables become insignificant when we restrict the comparison of the choice of deal 
structure to friendly acquisitions. 
6. Influence of deal structure on premiums 
6.1 Hypothesis and research design 
The criticisms of SOA are suggestive of target shareholders being disadvantaged when an 
acquisition is structured as a scheme. As a test of this criticism we examine if there is any 
difference in premiums between takeovers and schemes. Under existing regulation a bidder is 
entitled to proceed to compulsory acquisition in a SOA if 75% of shareholders approve the 
deal. This compares with the 90% ownership threshold to move to compulsory acquisition 
under the takeover legislation. Assuming an upward sloping supply curve Stulz (1988) argues 
that when more shareholders need to be convinced to accept an offer the bidding firm is 
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required to offer a higher premium. The lower threshold in SOA lead us to predict that 
premiums in schemes are lower than in takeovers.  This leads to Hypothesis Five: 
H5: Premiums are lower in SOA than in takeovers. 
To test Hypothesis Five we estimate the following OLS regression model. 
PREM = i + 1SOA + 2PAYT + 3MULT + 4FRIENDLY + 5TOEHOLD + 
6TDIROWN + 7TROA + 8TMB + 9TDE + 10TFCF + 11TLNMCAP + 12BLISTED + 
13MILLS + INDUSTRY + YEAR + i        (2a) 
The dependent variable is the premium measured as the initial offer price minus the target 
share price sixty days prior to the takeover announcement divided by the target firm price 
sixty days prior to the takeover announcement (PREM60). As alternative reference points, we 
also use the target share price 30 (PREM30) and 15 days (PREM15) prior to the takeover 
announcement to calculate the premium. The key independent test variable is the indicator 
variable denoting deals which are structured as a SOA (SOA). 
A number of control variables are included in regression model (2a).  We control for payment 
method as prior studies argue that premiums are higher when cash is offered as payment due 
to the increased tax liability of shareholders (Huang and Walkling, 1987; Draper and Paudyal 
1999 and da Silva Rosa et al., 2000). We denote method of payment using an indicator 
variable coded as one if the method of payment is exclusively cash (PAYT). Deals with 
multiple bidders are highlighted using an indicator variable coded as one when there is more 
than one simultaneous bidder for the target firm (MULT).  It is expected that premiums are 
greater in the presence of multiple bidders (Humphery-Jenner and Powell 2011). The nature 
of the takeover is controlled for using an indicator variable set as one if the initial 
recommendation of the target firm board is takeover acceptance (FRIENDLY). Prior research 
has found however that the attitude of the target firm is unrelated to premiums (Bates and 
Lemmon, 2003; Chapple et al., 2007; Bugeja, 2013).22 
The impact of the target firm ownership structure on premiums is modelled in Stulz (1988). 
He argues that target firms will receive a greater premium when the bidder must negotiate 
with an increased number of outside shareholders. As a result, it is expected that premiums 
will be negatively associated with the bidding firm toehold and positively associated with the 
                                                          
22 In contrast, Humpery-Jenner and Powell, 2011 find significant higher premiums in hostile takeovers. 
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ownership of the target firm board. The results in many prior studies are consistent with these 
expectations (Stulz et al., 1990; Bugeja and Walter, 1995; Sudarsanam et al., 1996; Bugeja 
and Sinelnikov, 2012). 
Model 2(a) includes the same controls for target firm financial characteristics as used in 
model (1). Target firm leverage is expected to increase takeover premiums as higher leverage 
results in a more concentrated ownership structure (Israel, 1991; Israel 1992).23  A larger 
target firm is expected to have higher bargaining power and as a result may be expected to 
receive a higher premium. Prior research however, reports inconsistent results with Anderson 
et al., (1994) and Bugeja (2013) finding a negative association between premiums and target 
firm size, whilst Betton et al., (2009) reports an insignificant result. Similar to Schwert (2000) 
the target firm market-to-book ratio is used as a control for target firm growth options. We 
also include a dummy variable highlighting deals announced by bidders not listed on the 
ASX (BLISTED). Bugeja (2011) finds that Australian target firms receive higher premiums 
from foreign bidders not listed on the ASX. Furthermore, Bugeja and Sinelnikov (2012) 
indicate that target firms earn lower abnormal returns around a takeover announcement when 
the bidder is an unlisted private firm. 
A potential issue we face with the estimation of model (2a) is that of of self-selection. 
Selection bias is an issue commonly faced in accounting and finance research (Tucker, 2010; 
Lennox et al., 2012). Selection bias arises because decisions made by firms are often chosen 
from amongst one or more alternatives. The researcher is then frequently interested in 
studying the consequences of making one choice relative to another.  However, the researcher 
can only observe the effect of the choice made, but not the effect of the choices not made by 
that firm. Furthermore, the researcher is typically unable to observe all the factors that were 
relevant to a firm when making their decision (Tucker, 2010). If the choice made by firms 
occurs non-randomly, the use of OLS regression results in biased coefficients due to an 
omitted correlated variables bias (Maddala, 1991). 
The two main approaches to dealing with this self-selection bias are the use of propensity 
score matching and the Heckman (1979) two–stage approach.24 Propensity score matching 
involves matching each firm that has made a choice to a control firm that has not made a 
                                                          
23 In contrast, Bugeja and Sinelnikov (2012) and Bugeja (2013) find a negative association between target firm 
leverage and takeover premiums. 
24 A detailed discussion of the implementation of and issues associated with the Heckman (1979) approach and 
propensity score matching is beyond the scope of this study. Interested readers should see (Tucker, 2010 and 
Lennox et al., 2012). 
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choice. Control firms are chosen based on the closeness of their propensity (i.e., probability) 
to make the choice of interest to a treatment firm. The propensity of making a particular 
choice is typically estimated from a logit or probit regression model that explains the choice 
of interest using theoretically relevant predictive variables. The outcome from using a sample 
comprising a matching of treatment and control firms based on the estimated propensity from 
this first stage regression is to control for selection bias arising from observable factors 
included in the first stage model. Propensity score matching does not control for selection 
bias arising from unobservable factors from the first stage regression. 
The second frequently used approach to correct for self-selection is the Heckman (1979) two-
step approach. This technique involves estimating a first-stage probit model that explains the 
choice of interest. A bias correction term (i.e., the inverse Mills ratio) is derived from the 
first-stage probit model and then added to the second-stage regression that analyse the 
consequences of the choice. The inverse Mills ratio in the second-stage regression controls 
for unobservable factors associated with the choice and corrects for potential selection bias. 
A number of previous takeover studies control for selection bias using the Heckman (1979) 
approach. For example, Akhtar (2014) compares the characteristics of Australian bidders and 
non-bidders and finds that bidding firms have significantly higher: cash leverage, capital 
expenditure and management overconfidence. Furthermore, using the Heckman (1979) 
approach, Bugeja et al., (2012) Bugeja and Sinelnikov (2012) and Bugeja (2013) also 
examine whether their results are sensitive to controlling for self-selection bias. 
In the context of the current study, since bidders select the choice of deal type it is possible 
that the characteristics associated with this choice are also associated with the takeover 
premium. To address this self-selection concern we follow the approach of Heckman (1979) 
and include the inverse Mills ratio (MILLS) determined from estimating model (1a) in the 
regression model. We prefer the Heckman (1979) approach to propensity score matching as 
the results in Table 5 indicate that model (1) explaining the choice of deal type explains 
approximately only 20-40% of the variance in the dependent variable. As such, there are 
likely a number of unobservable factors which explain the choice of deal type.25 
As discussed by Lennox et al., (2012) the implementation of the Heckman (1979) approach is 
most efficient when a variable included in the first-stage selection model can be validly 
                                                          
25 We also present the results using propensity score matching in the additional analysis (see Section 6.4). 
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excluded from the second-stage model. The variable that we use in the first-stage model that 
we exclude from the second stage is the ownership of the Top 1 shareholder. The results in 
Table 5 Panel A show that the ownership of the largest shareholder is positively associated 
with the use of schemes.  Furthermore, additional analysis (not tabulated) indicates that this 
variable is unrelated to takeover premiums and so can be validly excluded from the model. 
As a result, the inverse Mills ratio is calculated from estimating the first stage probit model 
using TOP1 as the measure of ownership concentration. Model (2a) is estimated initially for 
all deals and then alternatively for only SOA and friendly takeovers.  
To examine if the results are robust to the inclusion of bidding firm financial characteristics 
we amend model (2a) and estimate the regression using only ASX listed bidders. The bidding 
firm financial characteristics added to this regression (model 2(b)) are identical to those in 
model (1b).  In addition, we include the ownership of the bidding firm board (BDIROWN) at 
the date of the takeover announcement as an additional control. Prior research suggests that 
due to bidding firm agency problems, target firm shareholders earn the highest abnormal 
returns when bidding firms have lower director ownership (Betton et al., 2008). Bidding firm 
size and the market-to-book ratio have been found in prior research to be positively 
associated with takeover premiums (Officer, 2003).  
The findings in Panel B of Table 5 indicate that the choice of schemes for listed bidders is 
negatively associated with the number of target firm substantial shareholders. As a result, the 
first stage probit model we estimate to calculate the inverse Mills ratio included in model (2b) 
uses SUBSHNO as the measure of ownership concentration.26 
6.2 Descriptive statistics for additional variables included in premium model 
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics on those variables included in model (2) which are not 
included in model (1). Data on the offer price, method of payment, the percentage ownership 
of the bidding firm board are collected by reading through the relevant takeover and SOA 
documents lodged with the ASX. Similar to prior studies target shareholders receive 
substantial premiums, ranging between 25 and 31% depending on the reference date used to 
measure premiums.  Overall 65% of deals are classified as friendly and solely cash payment 
is offered in 61% of deals. 
                                                          
26 The conclusions from our findings are quantitatively similar if we continue to use TOP1 as the measure of 
ownership concentration in the first-stage probit model. 
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INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
We also present univariate tests of differences between the scheme and takeover groups. 
Although there is no difference in premiums between schemes and takeovers when we 
compare all deals, when we restrict the sample to friendly acquisitions we find that premiums 
are significantly lower in SOA. We also find that schemes are less likely to have multiple 
bidders and have significantly lower use of exclusively cash payment. There is no difference 
in bidding firm listing status or bidder board ownership between schemes and takeovers. 
A correlation matrix between the additional continuous regression variables in the model of 
takeover premiums and all other variables is presented in Table 7. Panel A shows the findings 
irrespective of bidding firm listing status, whilst Panel B presents the results for only deals 
with listed bidders. 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
As would be expected the three takeover premium measures are highly correlated. 
Inconsistent with expectations, the correlation between takeover premiums and the bidding 
firm toehold is positive. The size of the correlations evidenced in Table 7 indicates that 
multicollinearity is not likely to be an issue in the estimation of the regression models. 
6.3 Results of estimating the model of premiums 
Table 8 presents the results of the model to test whether there is any association between deal 
type and takeover premiums. 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
Similar to Table 5, Panel A of Table 8 presents the results for the full sample, whilst Panel B 
shows the findings for deals in which the bidder is listed on the ASX. In both panels results 
are shown for all deals and for only friendly deals respectively. The results are presented for 
each set of analyses with the takeover premium measured alternatively using the target share 
price 60, 30 and 15 days prior to the acquisition. 
In both panels, when only friendly deals are examined, the SOA indicator variable is negative 
and significant, irrespective of how the takeover premium is measured. When all deals are 
used for the analysis, the coefficient on the SOA dummy variable continues to be negative 
and significant except for the PREM15 and PREM30 regression models in Panel B. Overall, 
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these results are consistent with target shareholders being paid lower premiums in SOA than 
takeovers. Furthermore, these results support anecdotal claims in the financial press claiming 
disadvantage to target shareholders from the use of schemes. 
There is no consistent pattern of results for the control variables across the two Panels. For 
the target firm financial characteristics the results are largely consistent with higher premiums 
being paid for smaller target firms. There is also some evidence that target firms are offered 
increased premiums when they have higher free cash flow, leverage and market-to-book 
ratios. For the deal characteristic variables, the direction of the significant results on the 
indicator variables denoting cash payment and multiple bidders change sign amongst the 
different regression models. In contrast to prior literature the toehold interest of the bidder is 
unrelated to the size of the takeover premium. The findings in Panel A suggest lower 
premiums are paid by firms listed on the ASX in comparison to non-ASX listed bidders. The 
results in Panel B show that larger bidders pay higher premiums. There is also some evidence 
that the bidding firm market-to-book ratio is negatively associated with takeover premiums. 
6.4 Additional analysis 
As described above, the two main methods for dealing with self-selection bias are the use of 
the Heckman (1979) two-stage model and propensity score matching. The results in the 
previous section were presented using the Heckman (1979) approach, as we believe this 
method is best suited to our research question as it controls for self-section arising from 
unobservable factors. Despite this, to determine whether our results are sensitive to how we 
control for selection bias,we also use propensity score matching. We form matched pairs by 
selecting for each SOA a takeover bid with the closest propensity score.27 Propensity scores 
are computed from the results presented in Table 5 from estimating model (1). For all bidder 
types (i.e., Panel A of Table 5) we calculate propensity scores using the results of the model 
including the Top1 measure of ownership concentration. For listed bidders (i.e., Panel B of 
Table 5) we determine propensity scores based on the findings of the models using the 
number of substantial shareholders as the measure of ownership concentration.28 
In Table 9 we present the means for the SOA and takeover matched pairs for each variable 
included in model (1). We also present a t-test for whether the difference in means is 
significant. 
                                                          
27 Matched pairs are formed without replacement. 
28  The propensity score matching process is undertaken separately for friendly and all acquisitions. 
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INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
The findings in Table 9 indicate that when we consider all bidder types we have successfully 
matched across the two deal types for four of our eight covariates. They confirm the  
significant differences in toeholds and target firm leverage and size between the two groups. 
When we restrict our sample to listed bidders there is an increase in the number of covariates 
that exhibit no significant difference between SOA and takeovers. However, toeholds, target 
firm size and leverage of both the bidder and target remain significantly different between the 
two groups.29 
Table 10 presents a comparison of average takeover premiums for our propensity score 
matched sample. These results indicate there is no significant difference in takeover 
premiums between SOA and takeovers when we consider the entire sample. However, when 
we compare SOA with only friendly takeovers we find significantly lower takeover 
premiums for each of our three premium measures. These univariate results for our 
propensity score matched sample are similar to the findings for the total sample shown in 
Table 6. 
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE 
In Table 11 we present the results of an OLS regression of takeover premiums estimated 
using our propensity score matched pairs. The independent variables included in the 
regression model are the SOA indicator variable and the explanatory variables included in 
model (2) which were not employed as a covariate to form the matched pairs. Panel A shows 
the results for all bidders irrespective of listing status, whilst Panel B provides the results for 
only listed bidders. 
INSERT TABLE 11 HERE 
Consistent with the univariate results in Table 10 we find that takeover premiums are 
significantly lower when we compare SOA to friendly takeovers. The results on the control 
variables are generally insignificant, except for the listed bidder indicator variable which is 
negatively associated with takeover premiums in Panel A. 
7. Conclusion 
                                                          
29  The significant difference in covariates for some of our variables potentially confounds our propensity score 
matched results. As such, we have more confidence in the results from using the Heckman (1979) procedure. 
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Current Australian regulation allows firms to effect a change in corporate control using either 
a takeover bid or a SOA. This study investigates the factors which influence the choice to 
structure an acquisition between these two types. Additionally, we examine if there is any 
difference in premiums between schemes and takeovers. This analysis is motivated by the 
increasing use of SOA in recent years, which has resulted in public and regulatory debate as 
to whether schemes disadvantage target shareholders. Surprisingly, until this study this 
debate has taken place without a rigorous empirical investigation of the differences between 
SOA and takeovers. 
Our results indicate that the choice to use a SOA rather than a takeover bid, is associated with 
the ownership structure of the target firm. More specifically, schemes are used more 
frequently when the target firm has higher ownership concentration and the bidding firm has 
a lower toehold stake in the target. In addition, schemes are more likely to be used when the 
target firm is larger and the bidder has higher leverage. These findings are likely explained by 
the greater certainty of outcome associated with the “all or nothing” feature of SOA. 
We also examine if there is any difference in premiums between takeovers and schemes. 
Employing both the Heckman (1979) two-step approach and propensity score matching to 
control for self-selection of deal type, our results are largely consistent with target 
shareholders receiving significantly lower premiums in SOA consistent with the public 
criticism of schemes. However, we caution against interpreting these results as evidence 
supporting regulatory change, as there is no guarantee that target shareholders involved in a 
SOA would otherwise have received a takeover bid if schemes were not an alternative. 
Our findings are likely to be of interest to regulators in any future review of the laws 
governing Australian corporate control contests. For academic research examining Australian 
mergers and acquisitions our findings indicate that schemes and takeovers do not comprise a 
homogenous group and that it may be necessary to adjust the research design accordingly. 
Future research can further examine differences between SOA and takeovers. For instance, 
given our evidence of lower premiums in schemes, it may be interesting to examine if the 
outcome for target firm directors or acquiring firm performance differs between SOA and 
takeovers. Furthermore, we document that there are fewer multiple bidders in schemes than 
takeovers. Subsequent research can further examine how competition for target firms differs 
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Mkt cap in 
schemes 
2000 53 17 70 24% 25,874 9,192 35,067 26% 
2001 44 18 62 29% 8,342 5,698 14,040 41% 
2002 40 11 51 22% 5,134 2,676 7,810 34% 
2003 45 17 62 27% 11,960 12,739 24,700 52% 
2004 39 17 56 30% 22,990 12,226 35,215 35% 
2005 34 14 48 29% 21,973 5,766 27,738 21% 
2006 67 27 94 29% 27,329 20,746 48,075 43% 
2007 55 46 101 46% 15,936 67,009 82,945 81% 
2008 42 22 64 34% 24,425 35,541 59,966 59% 
2009 55 32 87 37% 5,615 37,335 42,950 87% 
2010 42 31 73 42% 7,285 13,535 20,820 65% 
2011 39 24 63 38% 14,411 8,117 22,528 36% 




Table 2: Industry Distribution of the Sample 




Takeover SOA Total 
SOA 
Percentage 
Energy 10 61 28 89 31% 
Materials 15 161 65 226 29% 
Industrials 20 66 23 89 26% 
Consumer Discretionary 25 77 35 112 31% 
Consumer Staples 30 32 16 48 33% 
Health Care 35 24 22 46 48% 
Financials 40 74 63 137 46% 
Information Technology 45 37 14 51 27% 
Telecommunication Services 50 10 5 15 33% 
Utilities 55 13 5 18 28% 




Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the variables included in the model determining the choice of deal type 






















TOP20 831 0.68 0.69 0.65 3.26*** 536 0.69 0.66 0.72 -4.45*** 
TOP5 831 0.51 0.52 0.48 2.78*** 536 0.53 0.49 0.56 -3.92*** 
TOP1 831 0.25 0.23 0.26 -2.23** 536 0.27 0.23 0.29 -3.42*** 
SUBSHNO 831 2.96 2.99 2.94 0.37 536 3.03 3.07 3.01 0.39 
SUBSHPER 831 0.47 0.40 0.51 -1.84* 536 0.46 0.41 0.49 -4.17*** 
TOEHOLD 831 0.13 0.03 0.18 -11.44*** 536 0.15 0.04 0.23 -10.95*** 
TDIROWN 831 0.11 0.10 0.12 -1.38 536 0.12 0.10 0.14 -2.53** 
TROA 831 -0.05 -0.00 -0.08 2.27** 536 -0.03 0.02 -0.06 1.83* 
TMB 831 2.31 2.33 2.30 0.14 536 2.21 2.25 2.18 0.28 
TDE 831 1.25 1.61 1.07 3.01*** 536 1.26 1.54 1.06 2.19** 
TFCF 831 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 1.38 536 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.89 
TLNMCAP 831 18.28 18.98 17.93 7.83*** 536 18.37 18.89 17.99 5.96*** 
BDE 476 1.62 2.58 1.14 4.44*** 298 1.68 2.29 1.20 2.75*** 
BMB 476 3.33 3.31 3.35 -0.07 298 3.16 3.11 3.20 -0.15 
BROA 476 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.40 298 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.84 
BLNMCAP 476 19.85 20.04 19.75 1.37 298 19.95 19.98 19.94 0.16 
BFCF 476 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.89 298 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.69 




Table 4 Pearson Correlation Matrix for the variables included in the model determining the choice of deal type 
Panel A: 
All bids 






TROA TMB TDE TFCF TLN 
MCAP 
BDE BMB BROA BLN 
MCAP 
BFCF 
TOP20 1                 
TOP5 0.91 1                
TOP1 0.66 0.83 1               
SUBSHNO 0.30 0.09 -0.20 1              
SUBSHPER 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.09 1             
TOEHOLD 0.35 0.42 0.47 -0.12 0.07 1            
TDIROWN 0.16 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.03 1           
TROA 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.02 -0.05 -0.06 1          
TMB -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.18 1         
TDE -0.10 -0.07 -0.04 -0.00 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 -0.16 0.28 1        
TFCF 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.51 -0.21 0.06 1       
TLNMCAP 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.30 0.32 0.16 0.10 0.27 1      
BDE -0.10 -0.08 -0.02 -0.08 -0.05 -0.08 -0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.62 0.08 0.21 1     
BMB 0.07 0.07 0.10 -0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.07 -0.16 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.18 1    
BROA 0.15 0.14 0.08 0.14 -0.02 0.06 0.02 0.26 -0.02 0.08 0.30 0.25 0.02 -0.08 1   
BLNMCAP 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.02 -0.04 0.13 -0.15 0.25 0.09 0.17 0.27 0.60 0.27 0.06 0.33 1  
BFCF 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.08 -0.09 0.08 0.04 0.16 -0.04 0.07 0.26 0.21 0.07 0.05 0.61 0.30 1 
Correlations that are significant at 10% or lower are denoted in bold text. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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TROA TMB TDE TFCF TLN 
MCAP 
BDE BMB BROA BLN 
MCAP 
BFCF 
TOP20 1                 
TOP5 0.90 1                
TOP1 0.66 0.82 1               
SUBSHNO -0.23 0.02 -0.26 1              
SUBSHPER 0.79 0.82 0.66 0.34 1             
TOEHOLD 0.37 0.44 0.48 -0.16 0.38 1            
TDIROWN 0.16 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.18 0.03 1           
TROA 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.08 -0.13 -0.06 1          
TMB -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.00 -0.06 -0.01 -0.05 -0.19 1         
TDE -0.15 -0.10 -0.06 -0.05 -0.08 0.06 0.05 -0.14 0.23 1        
TFCF 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.04 0.14 -0.02 0.03 0.49 -0.22 0.06 1       
TLNMCAP -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.10 -0.08 0.30 0.27 0.15 0.09 0.23 1      
BDE -0.13 -0.11 -0.06 -0.09 -0.15 -0.08 0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.58 0.05 0.15 1     
BMB 0.05 0.05 0.09 -0.09 0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.28 0.20 0.08 -0.01 -0.08 0.14 1    
BROA 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.16 0.16 0.08 0.01 0.16 0.03 0.07 0.25 0.23 -0.04 -0.13 1   
BLNMCAP 0.06 0.07 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.11 0.13 0.22 0.55 0.24 0.03 0.30 1  
BFCF 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.08 0.17 0.11 -0.00 0.09 -0.04 0.02 0.24 0.21 0.02 0.00 0.68 0.29 1 
Correlations that are significant at 10% or lower are denoted in bold text. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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 ALL DEALS   
FRIENDLY 











































- - - - -0.29 
(-0.65) 
- - - - 
TOP5 - 0.24 
(0.79) 
- - - - 0.03 
(0.07) 
- - - 
TOP1 - - 0.74 
(3.39)*** 
- - - - 0.36 
(2.91)*** 
- - 
SUBSHNO - - - -0.03 
(-0.87) 
- - - - -0.03 
(-0.94) 
- 
SUBSHPER - - - - -0.06 
(-1.14) 


























































































































N 831 831 831 831 831 536 536 536 536 536 
Pseudo R2 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.35 
Year  
dummies 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry 
dummies 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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* is significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%. The table reports the results of a probit regression examining factors which influence the choice 
to structure an acquisition as a SOA.  The dependent variable is a binary variable coded as one when the acquisition is a Scheme of Arrangement. Numbers in parentheses are 
robust t-statistics clustered by industry and target firm. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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 ALL DEALS   
FRIENDLY 











































- - - - -0.99 
(-1.26) 
- - - - 
TOP5 - 0.25 
(0.45) 
- - - - -0.44 
(-0.64) 
- - - 
TOP1 - - 0.45 
(1.08) 
- - - - -0.22 
(-0.33) 
- - 
SUBSHNO - - - -0.06 
(-2.17)** 
- - - - -0.10 
(-2.04)** 
- 
SUBSHPER - - - - -0.04 
(-0.62) 






















































































































































































BMB -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
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N 476 476 476 476 476 298 298 298 298 298 
Pseudo R2 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.40 
Year  
dummies 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry 
dummies 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
* is significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%. 
The table reports the results of a probit regression examining factors which influence the choice to structure an acquisition as a SOA.  The dependent variable is a binary variable coded 
as one when the acquisition is a Scheme of Arrangement. Numbers in parentheses are robust t-statistics clustered by industry and target firm. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
38 
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for additional variables included in the model of takeover premiums 






















PREM15 831 0.25 0.23 0.26 -1.26 536 0.26 0.22 0.30 -2.89*** 
PREM30 831 0.27 0.24 0.28 -1.47 536 0.28 0.23 0.32 -2.91*** 
PREM60 831 0.31 0.30 0.32 -0.74 536 0.34 0.28 0.39 -2.70*** 
PAYT 831 0.61 0.51 0.66 -16.68*** 536 0.61 0.51 0.68 -17.40*** 
MULT 831 0.21 0.14 0.24 -11.04*** 536 0.15 0.09 0.19 -10.51*** 
FRIENDLY 831 0.65 0.82 0.56 56.54*** 536 - - - - 
BDIROWN 476 0.12 0.11 0.13 -1.17 298 0.13 0.12 0.13 -0.62 
BLISTED 476 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.03 298 0.56 0.58 0.54 0.75 




Table 7 Pearson Correlation Matrix for additional variables included in the model of takeover premiums  
Panel A: 
All bidders 
PREM15 PREM30 PREM60 BDIROWN 
PREM15 1    
PREM30 0.83 1   
PREM60 0.70 0.76 1  
BDIROWN -0.04 -0.07 -0.08 1 
TOP20 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 
TOP5 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.02 
TOP1 0.08 0.06 0.08 -0.04 
SUBSHNO -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.07 
SUBSHPER 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.07 
TOEHOLD 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.03 
TDIROWN 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.22 
TROA -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.14 
TMB -0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.01 
TDE 0.01 0.07 0.08 -0.01 
TFCF 0.01 0.06 0.06 -0.18 
TLNMCAP -0.12 -0.12 -0.10 -0.31 
BDE -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.07 
BMB -0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.12 
BROA 0.05 0.06 0.04 -0.01 
BLNMCAP 0.11 0.10 0.17 -0.33 
BFCF 0.07 0.04 0.06 -0.06 
     Correlations that are significant at 10% or lower are denoted in bold text. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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PREM15 PREM30 PREM60 BDIROWN 
PREM15 1    
PREM30 0.85 1   
PREM60 0.75 0.79 1  
BDIROWN -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 1 
TOP20 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.02 
TOP5 0.06 0.04 0.02 -0.03 
TOP1 0.07 0.03 0.03 -0.10 
SUBSHNO -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.08 
SUBSHPER 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.07 
TOEHOLD 0.22 0.15 0.14 0.04 
TDIROWN 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.22 
TROA -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.09 
TMB -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
TDE 0.02 0.05 0.07 -0.01 
TFCF 0.01 0.06 0.08 -0.13 
TLNMCAP -0.14 -0.15 -0.14 -0.30 
BDE -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.09 
BMB -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.09 
BROA 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 
BLNMCAP 0.18 0.13 0.19 -0.36 
BFCF 0.09 0.02 0.02 -0.04 
     Correlations that are significant at 10% or lower are denoted in bold text. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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N 831 831 831 536 536 536 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.09 
F-Stat 5.86*** 4.13*** 4.22*** 4.88*** 4.05*** 5.38*** 
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Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry dummies          Y Y         Y Y     Y Y 
* is significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%. 
The table reports the results of an OLS regression testing the association between takeover premiums and whether an acquisition is a SOA.  The dependent variable is 
alternatively measured as the takeover premium calculated using the target share price 15 (PREM15), 30 (PREM30) and 60 (PREM60) days before the takeover 
announcement. Numbers in parentheses are robust t-statistics clustered by industry and target firm. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 8: Second stage OLS model of takeover premiums - continued 
Panel B: 
ASX Bidders 

































































































































































































BFCF 0.14 -0.02 0.05 0.29 0.04 -0.01 
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N 476 476 476 298 298 298 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.18 
F-Stat 3.21*** 2.89*** 4.66*** 3.90*** 3.36*** 5.06*** 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry dummies          Y Y         Y Y     Y Y 
* is significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%. 
The table reports the results of an OLS regression testing the association between takeover premiums and whether an acquisition is a SOA.  The dependent variable is 
alternatively measured as the takeover premium calculated using the target share price 15 (PREM15), 30 (PREM30) and 60 (PREM60) days before the takeover 
announcement. Numbers in parentheses are robust t-statistics clustered by industry and target firm. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
45 
 
Table 9: Propensity score matched pair covariate balance of means 
 All bidder types   All bidder types friendly only   Listed bidders only   Listed bidders and friendly bids   
 SOA Takeover t-test SOA Takeover t-test SOA Takeover t-test SOA Takeover t-test 
TOEHOLD 0.03 0.06 -4.43*** 0.04 0.12 -7.71*** 0.01 0.04 -4.33*** 0.01 0.11 -10.37*** 
TOP1 0.23 0.22 0.28 0.23 0.24 -0.24 - - - - - - 
SUBSHNO - - - - - - 2.84 3.01 -0.89 2.90 3.14 -1.12 
TDIROWN 0.10 0.11 -0.88 0.10 0.13 -1.81* 0.09 0.11 -1.49 0.09 0.14 -2.78*** 
TROA 0.01 -0.06 1.76* 0.02 -0.04 1.50 -0.01 -0.04 0.68 0.01 -0.07 1.43 
TMB 2.33 2.31 0.08 2.24 2.18 0.26 2.59 2.30 0.79 2.38 2.20 0.52 
TDE 1.57 1.10 2.14** 1.53 1.02 2.17** 1.77 0.87 2.85*** 1.55 1.18 1.07 
TFCF 0.01 -0.10 0.84 0.01 0.00 0.19 -0.01 -0.04 1.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 
TLNMCAP 18.99 18.46 3.32*** 18.88 18.17 4.47*** 18.92 18.23 3.12*** 18.84 17.89 4.46*** 
BFCF - - - - - - 0.03 -0.00 1.75* 0.19 0.28 -0.55 
BROA - - - - - - 0.01 0.00 0.51 0.01 0.02 -0.51 
BDE - - - - - - 2.58 1.25 2.98*** 2.29 1.25 2.33** 
BMB - - - - - - 3.31 3.54 -0.35 3.11 3.20 -0.15 
BLNMCAP - - - - - - 20.04 19.53 2.01** 19.98 19.92 0.19 
N 276 276  226 226  158 158  130 130  
* is significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%. This table reports mean values for each variable for the propensity score matched sample of SOA 
and takeovers. The table also reports a t-test indicating whether the difference in means between SOA and takeovers is significant. 
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Table 10: Propensity score matched pair mean premium differences 
 All bidder types   All bidder types friendly only   Listed bidders only   Listed bidders and friendly bids   
 SOA Takeover t-test SOA Takeover t-test SOA Takeover t-test SOA Takeover t-test 
PREM15 0.23 0.22 0.39 0.22 0.28 -1.97** 0.16 0.19 -0.82 0.14 0.28 -3.70*** 
PREM30 0.24 0.25 -0.35 0.23 0.31 -2.58** 0.17 0.20 -0.88 0.15 0.33 -4.56*** 
PREM60 0.29 0.28 0.37 0.28 0.38 -2.49** 0.18 0.20 -0.59 0.16 0.37 -4.66*** 
N 276 276  226 226  158 158  130 130  
* is significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%. This table reports mean takeover premiums for the propensity score matched sample of SOA and 
takeovers. The table also reports a t-test indicating whether the difference in means between SOA and takeovers is significant. 
47 
 












































































N 552 552 552 452 452 452 
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.079 
F-Stat 3.29*** 3.23*** 9.21*** 5.65*** 3.76*** 7.95*** 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 












































































N 316 316 316 260 260 260 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.10 
F-Stat 0.50 0.64 1.13 4.32*** 5.44*** 6.78*** 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
* is significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%. 
The table reports the results of an OLS regression testing the association between takeover premiums and 
whether an acquisition is a SOA for a propensity score matched sample. The dependent variable is alternatively 
measured as the takeover premium calculated using the target share price 15 (PREM15), 30 (PREM30) and 60 
(PREM60) days before the takeover announcement. Numbers in parentheses are robust t-statistics clustered by 





Variable names and definitions 
Variable name Definition 
PREM15 The takeover premium calculated as the offer price minus the target share 
price 15 days prior to the takeover announcement, divided by the price 15 
days prior to the takeover announcement 
PREM30 The takeover premium calculated as the offer price minus the target share 
price 30 days prior to the takeover announcement, divided by the price 30 
days prior to the takeover announcement 
PREM60 The takeover premium calculated as the offer price minus the target share 
price 60 days prior to the takeover announcement, divided by the price 60 
days prior to the takeover announcement 
SOA An indicator variable denoting acquisitions which are implemented using a 
Scheme of Arrangement 
CONC Target firm ownership concentration measured alternatively as: the 
ownership of the Top 20 (TOP20)/Top 5(TOP5)/Top 1 (TOP1) shareholders 
or the number of substantial shareholders (SUBSHNO) or the aggregate 
ownership of substantial shareholders (SUBSHPER) 
PAYT An indicator variable denoting takeovers in which the method of payment is 
exclusively cash 
MULT An indicator variable denoting takeovers in which there are two or more 
competing offers for the target firm 
FRIENDLY An indicator variable denoting target firms where the initial 
recommendation of the target firm board is takeover acceptance 
TOEHOLD The toehold stake of the bidder in the target firm at the announcement of the 
takeover 
TDIROWN The percentage ownership of the target firm board in the target firm at the 
announcement of the takeover 
TROA Target firm return on assets for the year prior to the takeover 
TMB Target firm market-to-book ratio calculated at the end of the financial year 
prior to the takeover announcement 
TDE Target firm ratio of debt to equity at the end of the financial year prior to the 
takeover announcement 
TFCF Target firm free cash flow for the financial year prior to the takeover 
announcement 
TLNMCAP Target firm size measured as the natural logarithm of market capitalisation 
at the end of the financial year prior to the takeover announcement 
BDE Bidding firm ratio of debt to equity at the end of the financial year prior to 
the takeover announcement 
BMB Bidding firm market-to-book ratio calculated at the end of the financial year 
prior to the takeover announcement 
BROA Bidding firm return on assets for the year prior to the takeover 
BLNMCAP Bidding firm size measured as the natural logarithm of market capitalisation 
at the end of the financial year prior to the takeover announcement 
BFCF Target firm free cash flow for the financial year prior to the takeover 
announcement 
BDIROWN The percentage ownership of the bidding firm board in the bidding firm at 
the announcement of the takeover 
BLISTED An indicator variable denoting acquisitions in which the bidding firms is 
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listed on the ASX 
MILLS The inverse Mills ratio 
 
 
